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This article considers the question: “What are the legal and ethical 
responsibilities of attorneys when offering scientific expert evidence to courts?” To a 
lesser extent it considers the responsibilities of attorneys to challenge such evidence 
when proffered and the ethical dimensions of the working relationship of lawyers 
and experts. Although the most prominent discussions of such issues have concerned 
so-called junk science in civil trials,2 the legal context upon which this article will 
focus is the criminal trial, where dubious science is more common,3 less questioned,4 
                                                                
1Professor of Law, Arizona State University. Ph.D. (1975) Ohio State University; M.S.L. 
(1983) Yale Law School. Portions of this article are based on portions of the author’s chapter, 
Ethical Standards of and Concerning Expert Witnesses, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (2d ed.) (David Faigman, David Kaye, Michael Saks 
& Joseph Sanders eds., 2002). 
2See PETER HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE (1991); KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, 
JUDGING SCIENCE (1997). 
3Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters 
with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 1069 (1998). 
4D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty 
Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALBANY L. REV. 99 (2000) (concluded: 
We have seen that, on their face, the numbers seem to indicate that civil defendants 
have benefitted greatly from Daubert but that criminal defendants have not. This 
seems especially true in regard to what might be called non-science forensic science, 
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and has even become institutionalized. The rules and practices of civil cases are 
provided for the illuminating contrasts they provide. 
I.  EMERGING CHALLENGES TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 
Two events have converged to bring into question some or much of the forensic 
science that has been offered to courts in criminal trials for much of the past century. 
One of those is an unexpectedly revolutionary change in the law governing the 
admissibility of scientific evidence, namely, the Daubert family of cases, a series of 
U.S. Supreme Court opinions in which all of  the major holdings were decided 
unanimously.5  In 1993 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,6 the Court 
held, contrary to most of the circuits, that the admissibility of scientific expert 
testimony did not turn on whether the expert community in question agreed among 
themselves that they were in possession of dependable knowledge, but on whether 
the putative knowledge could be demonstrated to be valid, and that this gatekeeping 
responsibility was not limited to “novel” proffers.7  Four years later in General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner,8 the Court held that the standard of review for admissibility 
decisions under Daubert was the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard and that a 
reasonably tight logic had to connect the expert’s premises and conclusions. Two 
years later in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,9 the Court decided a third case 
addressing the extent and nature of judicial gatekeeping of expert testimony. Kumho 
Tire presented the question of whether the rigorous scrutiny called for by Daubert10 
applies only to science, or whether it extends to other kinds of expert testimony, 
namely, “technical or other specialized” evidence.11 The Court held that all proffered 
expert evidence, regardless of whether it is “scientific,” “technical,” or “other,” must 
be demonstrated to be valid or must be denied admission.12 
                                                          
and it appears to be attributable partly to the inertia of courts, but at least as much to 
the criminal defense bar’s failure to construct sophisticated challenges and develop the 
evidence to support them.). 
5For a discussion of what problems in scientific evidence these opinions create as well as 
solve, see Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert 
Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229 (2000). 
6509 U.S. 579. 
7Id. at 597. 
8522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
9526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
10Oddly enough, most courts have been slow to realize that in many situations Daubert 
requires more stringent oversight than the “general acceptance” test of Frye v. United States, 
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  A number of fields that easily had gained entry under Frye 
have found themselves at increased risk of exclusion under Daubert. This seeming paradox is 
largely a consequence of courts accepting at face value what Daubert said about the test it 
created, rather than looking at what the test does. See Saks, supra note 3. 
11See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
12The Court realized that the criteria would differ from one kind of expertise to another. 
For a thoughtful discussion of different types of expertise and the different kinds of scrutiny 
that will be needed for them, see D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional 
Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/8
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Many lower courts and commentators did not immediately realize that these 
decisions sometimes created more rigorous gatekeeping requirements than what the 
courts were accustomed to (and sometimes created less rigorous requirements). The 
explanation of when they do and when they don’t and why is not difficult. (Table 1 
will assist the reader with the following explanation.) The Frye test determines 
whether a proposition enjoys general acceptance in the relevant field or fields.  The 
Daubert test poses the question whether the proposition is valid.  In most instances, 
these two different questions will produce the same result. When a proposition has a 
valid foundation it is likely to enjoy general acceptance, and either test will result in 
admission. When a proposition has a weak scientific foundation it is likely to be low 
in general acceptance, and either test will result in exclusion. But in some 
circumstances the two tests will produce different results. For example, cutting-edge 
science will be more readily admitted by Daubert than by Frye when the science is 
strong but there has been insufficient time for the wider field to learn about it and 
come to “generally accept” it. On the other hand, when propositions have gained 
general acceptance within a field even though their scientific underpinnings are 
untested, weakly supported, or have been found to be incorrect, the Frye test would 
admit expert testimony on such beliefs while Daubert would exclude the testimony. 
Forensic science falls into that latter category: widely accepted beliefs that have been 
subjected to little if any systematic testing, or which continue to be accepted within 
their field despite testing which reveals them to be doubtful.  
 
 





Daubert/Kumho: Valid Foundation 
 






















Moreover, the language of Rule 702 has recently been amended in order to make 
even more clear the (sometimes) tighter requirements implicit in the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Daubert.  Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence confront old and 
unquestioned forensic sciences with a finer filter than they had ever been tested by 
previously.  
The second important event is the wave of DNA exonerations. If the criminal 
justice community and the public were startled to learn that numerous innocent 
people were convicted of serious crimes and sentenced to long terms of 
imprisonment and sometimes even to execution, they will be even more surprised to 
learn that forensic science has played a large part in those erroneous convictions. 
Table 2 summarizes types of evidence which apparently led to the original 
convictions which eventually were vacated in the light of exculpatory DNA 
                                                          
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 2 (David Faigman, David Kaye, Michael Saks & 
Joseph Sanders eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
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evidence. The incidence of forensic science error appears to be second only to the 
incidence of errors caused by eyewitness error.13 
 
 
Table 2.  Factors Leading to Wrongful Conviction 14 
 
 
Factor % of cases occurring in 
 
Eyewitness errors  71 
Forensic science errors 63 
Police Misconduct  44 
Prosecutorial misconduct  40 
Poor lawyering by defense counsel 28 
False confessions 19 
False information from informants  17 
False witness testimony  17 
 
 
Table 2 does not include fraudulent forensic science expert testimony, but only 
apparently honest errors. In the realm of fraudulent testimony, however, these data 
suggest forensic science has no peer. One fourth of the cases involved some kind of 
fraudulent forensic science. Forensic scientists have been caught forging the 
fingerprints of innocent suspects on crime scene evidence, reporting the “results” of 
tests never performed, reporting inculpatory results when the tests were exculpatory, 
inventing tests that only they can perform, or exaggerating the capabilities of tests to 
                                                                
13These numbers are, of course, changing all the time, not only because new DNA (and 
sometimes non-DNA) exoneration cases emerge, but because of changes in  legal procedure 
and an evolving understanding of what went wrong in the original trials. Thus, the wide 
promulgation of scientifically based guidelines for improved eyewitness identification 
procedures, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), is expected to reduce the incidence of erroneous eyewitness 
identifications. Similarly, as microscopic hair identification declines in use, false positive 
forensic science errors will decline (because errors in hair identification were the leading 
cause of erroneous convictions). On the other hand, crimes involving handwriting 
identification are not prominent on this list not because handwriting identification does not 
lead to errors, D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of 
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge:  The Case of Handwriting Identification 
“Expertise,”  137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989), but because forgery and other crime related 
writing often do not involve DNA. As we delve more deeply into the role of forensic science 
in these erroneous convictions, we are likely to find that some false convictions involving 
biological markers (pre-DNA typing) were not categorically erroneous, but merely included 
the defendant in a pool of candidate perpetrators, evidence which did not pinpoint the 
defendant but added to the accumulated evidence of the case. On the other hand, we may find 
that the experts offering such evidence overstated its diagnosticity, so that the “error” was not 
so much a matter of erroneous science but exaggerated math (that is, exaggerated 
characterization of the diagnosticity of the inferences that can be drawn). 
14
 These data are drawn from a database of DNA exoneration cases maintained by The 
Innocence Project, Inc., at Cardozo Law School. They should be regarded as preliminary for 
the reasons discussed in note 13, supra. 
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make them more conclusive than they are or more consistent with other evidence in 
the case.15  
II.  ETHICAL ISSUES 
Fraud by expert witnesses is the least subtle of the ethical problems we will 
examine. Far more challenging are the difficulties of assessing the validity of sincere 
but questionable science, whether lawyers or only courts bear the burden of those 
assessments, and determining the ethical obligations that accompany such 
assessments. 
 
A.  Fraud by Charlatans and by Genuine Experts 
Where a proffered expert knows himself or herself to be a quack or otherwise to 
be offering false testimony, the situation is like that of any other witness who is 
perpetrating a fraud on the court. Such acts are illegal as well as unethical.16 A more 
ambiguous version of this is the proffered expert who comes from a field that has 
valid knowledge and is capable of doing sound work, but in the case at bar the expert 
has failed to perform according to the expected standards (“with the same intellectual 
rigor,” as some courts and commentators have put it) and that looseness has 
produced less reliable results (which presumably leads to conclusions that tilt the 
testimony further in the direction of the proponent’s preferred position).17  
For the purposes of the present discussion, the interesting questions in these 
situations emerge from the lawyer’s responsibilities in calling such witnesses to the 
stand. If the lawyer knows the testimony is invalid or fraudulent, the lawyer’s 
obligation is to prevent the witness’s testimony from entering the court.18 But to what 
                                                                
15See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for 
Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439 (1997).  See also UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE FBI LABORATORY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO 
LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED AND OTHER 
CASES (April 1997), available at www.usdoj.gov/oig/fbilab1/fbil1toc.htm. 
16That is not to say that police, prosecutors or courts find it easy to prosecute or convict 
the perpetrators of such frauds, though one might have expected the courts to take severe 
umbrage at those who abused the courts’ and the public’s trust. West Virginia’s difficulties 
bringing Fred Zane to account is one example. 
17Some courts and commentators, apparently in search of an easier test of junk science 
than Daubert articulates, have focused on the notion that if the expert at bar performs at the 
same level that people in his field operate at in matters outside of court, then all will be well. 
See, e.g., J. Brook Lathram, The “Same Intellectual Rigor” Test Provides an Effective Method 
for Determining the Reliability of All Expert Testimony, Without Regard to Whether the 
Testimony Comprises “Scientific Knowledge” or “Technical or Other Specialized 
Knowledge,” 28 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1053 (1998). The failure to perform up to par certainly 
can be one reason for undependable expert testimony, but it is far from the only reason expert 
evidence can lack validity. The flaw in the reasoning of those cases which, and commentators 
who, have become enamored of the “same intellectual rigor test” can be made obvious with 
one word: astrology. 
18There are several complex and debatable exceptions to the prohibition on false or 
misleading testimony, but they need not delay us since they are inapplicable to expert 
witnesses. 
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extent is the lawyer obligated to investigate and ensure that the expert is not a 
charlatan and that the testimony in the particular case is not fraudulent? Is it 
sufficient for the lawyer to accept the asserted expert’s claims about himself, the 
field, and the particular testimony? 
The ethical rules governing the offering of witnesses at trial are generally written 
to prohibit the knowing perpetration of a fraud on the court. For ordinary fact 
witnesses this makes obvious good sense. It generally would be difficult or 
impossible for an attorney to develop sufficient independent knowledge of the facts 
of a case to be in a position to decide which witnesses are telling the truth and which 
are not. After all, the witnesses typically are the source of whatever knowledge there 
is about a disputed event. In the instance of expert witnesses who are charlatans or 
who are genuine experts but who are lying about the tests performed or the results of 
those tests, the attorney’s obligation arguably parallels the situation with lay 
witnesses. Assuring that the expert’s qualifications and background are what they are 
asserted to be and that the materials upon which the expert worked, if any, satisfy the 
requirements of authentication, is comparable to the obligation to assure that the 
necessary foundation for a lay witness is present, such as that the witness had 
personal knowledge of the facts to be testified about.  Indeed, one would think that a 
competent lawyer would want to research this in the expectation that the attorney on 
the other side is doing so. As to whether the witness is going to tell lies on the stand, 
the situation of the lay witness and the expert witness are almost indistinguishable: 
the attorney may detect contradictions, but is in not in a position to know the content 
of what the witness did or did not observe. Thus, so long as the attorney is 
reasonably diligent and does not seek to remain knowingly ignorant about facts that 
would disclose whether a fraud was occurring, the attorney cannot be faulted if a 
witness, including a scientific expert witness, lies to the attorney and then to the 
court.19 
B.  The Sincere Expert with Poor Science 
Quite a different situation presents itself when the expertise is dubious, but the 
expert does not recognize or appreciate the weaknesses of his field’s foundations. 
This is the situation with some forensic science. While at first blush this state of 
affairs might seem to insulate the proffering attorney even more than the situation 
described in the preceding subsection, further thought suggests otherwise.  
Any attorney, like any intelligent citizen, who takes the time and effort to 
research a purported scientific subject has the potential to reach her own conclusions 
about whether or not the field’s beliefs rest on a foundation of data and logic that is 
solid, soft, mushy, or non-existent. It is hard to think of principled reasons why an 
attorney should not be obligated to acquire a good faith basis for believing either that 
the proffered expertise is valid or that the specific facts or skills brought to bear on 
the task-at-hand in the trial are valid as a precondition for ethically offering such 
expert evidence to a court.20 Reasons of practicality and efficiency, but not principle, 
                                                                
19We have quite a different situation where police and prosecutors sought out the services 
of Fred Zane after he was found out to be a charlatan and a fraud and he fled to another state, 
yet they continued to send work to him. See Giannelli, supra note 15. 
20The argument that it is too time consuming or difficult for the attorney to become 
conversant with the subject matter fails because, once in court, especially in a Daubert 
hearing, the attorney will have the burden of rationally educating and persuading the judge 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/8
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might justify exempting the proponent of scientific evidence from the obligation to 
know whether the evidence is valid. The argument would be that it is inefficient and 
burdensome for the proponent of expert evidence to have to engage in research for 
every kind of expertise she wishes to offer and that it would be more efficient (for 
the attorney making the proffer) to leave it to the potential opponent of admission to 
raise initial doubts and ask for a Daubert hearing for those experts and expertises 
about which there are doubts. From the court’s viewpoint, of course, this is anything 
but practical and efficient.  
For example, consider the situation of a treating physician who believes sincerely 
that his patient’s cancer is caused by a chemical made by the defendant, but no 
research has ever been conducted showing general causation between the chemical 
and the disease. The physician ought to know enough about science, and about the 
literature on this condition, to know the grounds for asserting this cause-effect 
relationship do not exist. But his belief is nevertheless sincere.21 Or, to take another 
example, suppose the asserted expert is performing a task that is said to be based on 
sound science, but the expert is only a technician who follows the field’s cookbook 
procedures and has no knowledge or understanding of the underlying science. And 
suppose that any scientist, and any properly informed court, would conclude that the 
expert has no valid basis for his work or at least no valid basis that is yet known. But 
the expert does not know this.22 Can the attorney ethically offer the testimony of such 
an asserted expert to a court? Or does the attorney have an obligation to first find out 
enough about the underlying science claims to have a good faith belief that what is 
being offered to the court is valid, as a precondition for making the proffer?  
If the attorney is prohibited only from offering false expertise when she knows it 
to be false, then ignorance is bliss for both the proffered expert and the attorney. 
Indeed, the attorney would be rewarded for not going to the trouble to learn about the 
expertise. Then the burden of screening out junk science falls entirely on the 
opponent of admission and on the court. Furthermore, if the proponent of the expert 
evidence is a public prosecutor, a greater burden may attach, given the special 
obligations of prosecutors to pursue truth and not merely to win cases. 23   
                                                          
that the expertise is valid, and that can only be done competently if the attorney has taken the 
time and effort to learn about the asserted expertise. Also, because the attorney as proponent 
of the expert evidence has the burden of persuading the court that it meets the admissibility 
requirements, she cannot say that the obligation to figure out what is valid and what is not 
rests primarily on the court. 
21The witness might think: the necessary research may not have been done yet to prove it, 
but if and when it is conducted I am sure it will bear out my faith and my intuition. 
22The clearest illustration of such a non-expertise is that of handwriting identification. See, 
e.g., United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F.Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Hines, 
55 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.Mass. 1999); United States v. Saelee (2001 WL 1078140). 
23The prosecutor must scrupulously avoid misleading the court or the jury as to the 
evidence, and may be disciplined for knowingly offering false evidence, failing to withdraw it 
upon discovering its falsity, or bringing evidence before the court without a good faith belief 
in its admissibility. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1), DR 7-102(A)(4), (5) 
(1998); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.4(e), DR 7-106(C)(1) (1981); ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standards 3-5.6, 3-5.8 (3d ed. 
1993). 
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C.  What Foundation is Necessary for an Ethical Proffer of Asserted Expertise? 
If a good faith belief is ethically required, what would constitute sufficient 
grounds for a good faith belief? Clearly something more would be required than 
reliance on the expert’s assertions about his field and himself. Otherwise, lawyers 
could properly offer astrologers to courts. Is it enough for the lawyer to accept the 
popular culture’s belief about the existence and nature of the expertise, and offer 
conclusions resulting from the application of the field’s supposed principles? If so, 
astrology still could properly be offered. Is it enough for the lawyer to not know that 
the expert is not an expert or that the expertise is not valid? Or, in the realm of expert 
evidence, does the sponsoring attorney have a duty to the court to find out?24  
If what is ethically required is a reasonable good faith belief, it seems inescapable 
that the attorney could not use a shortcut or proxy test, but would have to at least ask 
herself: Do I know enough about this subject so that if it were challenged under 
Daubert I could make a well-grounded showing that, at least on current knowledge, 
it satisfies the relevant validity criteria?25 
Handwriting identification expert testimony is an apt area for exploring answers 
to the ethical questions posed above. Its practitioners are said to be technicians who 
cannot be expected to know much about the underlying science.26  Moreover, there is 
a severe lack of underlying science. There are few if any cases in which Daubert 
challenges to handwriting expertise did not result in judicial declarations that the 
                                                                
24An infamous forensic dentist from Mississippi invented techniques that were never 
tested, which he could not document, which he alone could perform, and which went beyond 
the domain of bitemark impressions. More than this, in his opinions he exaggerated the 
certainty of the conclusions that any of his techniques—including conventional bitemark 
analysis—could produce (by habitually declaring his conclusions to be, “indeed and without 
doubt”).  As a result, several of the professional associations to which he belonged denounced 
him and suspended or terminated his membership, though not before his testimony led to 
convictions of persons later determined to be actually innocent. Did the prosecutors who put 
him on the stand have no independent professional obligation to ascertain that his investigative 
inventions and his testimony were valid? (After he was exposed, he continued to be used as an 
expert witness. Did those prosecutors have an additional burden to insure that he was not 
offering junk science to the courts, or could they take his word for it that he was not?) Another 
infamous forensic scientist, Fred Zane of West Virginia, was renowned for coming up with the 
answers that investigators and prosecutors wanted for their cases, mostly by making up the 
results of tests never performed. Did the prosecutors who used his work have any obligation to 
insure the validity of what he was offering beyond taking him at his word?  His “work” was so 
greatly appreciated that after he was exposed and fired and fled to another state, West Virginia 
law enforcement officials continued to send cases to him for his reports and opinions. For 
details on these and many other instances of fraud by expert witnesses, see Giannelli, supra 
note 15. 
25In United States v. McVeigh, 1997 WL 47724 (D.Colo., Transcript, 1997) (Oklahoma 
City Bombing Case), the Government decided not to offer a handwriting expert witness on the 
basis that such a proffer likely would not pass muster in the Daubert hearing that would have 
been required. Another assistant U.S. attorney, who said that he had been prosecuting cases for 
twenty-five years, approached the author at a federal judicial conference and stated that he no 
longer offers handwriting experts at trial because he believes they lack sufficient foundation to 
justify their testimony. 
26See Andre M. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-Daubert 
World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251 (1998). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/8
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field lacked a valid scientific basis.  These rulings also often place limits of one kind 
or another on the testimony of handwriting experts.27 Yet apparently the examiners’ 
personal faith in the validity of what they do was, and remains, heartfelt–even after 
the field’s weaknesses have been exposed and judged. Did the attorneys28 who 
offered handwriting expert evidence have an ethical obligation to look below the 
surface, to make sure they were not offering false or misleading evidence to the 
courts, or was it permissible for them to continue offering such experts until the 
courts stopped them?29  
Once challenges were made, presumably the proponents offered the courts the 
best case they could for continued admission. But what happens after some number 
of courts have considered the challenges and routinely rejected claims of handwriting 
expertise? What then is the obligation of subsequent proponents? At what point, if 
any, do attorneys, especially prosecutors, have an ethical duty to independently 
evaluate the validity of handwriting expertise, and continue to offer it only if they 
reach a considered judgment that it is valid and that they can make a sound case to a 
court that it ought to be admitted?30 Or may they ethically continue to offer it even 
though they cannot defend its claims of validity to themselves or to courts with 
anything but the flimsiest of scientific support or none at all?31 
D.  Is There a Duty to Divulge the Weaknesses of the Science One Proffers? 
If an attorney does, for whatever reason, offer dubious expertise to a court, what 
are the proponent’s obligations to opposing counsel and to the court? Is there a duty 
to disclose known weaknesses of the science or the cases that have considered and 
rejected, to one degree or another, the claims of the proffered field?  
                                                                
27See D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: 
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 28-1.4 (David Faigman, David Kaye, Michael 
Saks & Joseph Sanders eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
28Presumably, if there is such a duty to offer only valid evidence to the court, the duty falls 
more heavily on criminal prosecutors than on lawyers offering such expertise in civil cases. It 
is, however, hard to see why it would make a difference on what is an implicit motion to admit 
an expertise on the grounds that it satisfies the requirements of Daubert. 
29This becomes relevant with respect to other forensic sciences that share similar 
weaknesses with asserted handwriting identification expertise. What, if any, independent 
obligation do the proponents of such evidence have following Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)? Or is it ethically proper for them to continue offering the 
evidence whether or not they have satisfied themselves about its validity? 
30See supra note 25.  
31If the reader examines the offerings of the proponents of handwriting experts in the cases 
cited at supra note 22, the reader will be astonished at how little the proponents could offer on 
its behalf. Assistant U.S. Attorney Orenstein, whose decision it was in United States v. 
McVeigh that handwriting expert evidence was unlikely to pass a Daubert test, has indicated 
that despite a lack of empirical evidence supporting the claims of forensic handwriting experts, 
he believes in them anyway. See J. Orenstein, Effect of the Daubert Decision on Document 
Examination From the Prosecutor’s Perspective, 1 FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMUNICATIONS 
(1999), at www.fbi.gov/programs/lab/fsc/backissu/oct1999/ abstrcte.htm. 
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The answer may depend upon whether the scientific material in question 
constitutes adjudicative facts or legislative facts.32 Understanding these legal 
concepts requires the reader to have some understanding of the nature of scientific 
knowledge. Scientific knowledge can be viewed as existing at several levels of 
abstraction, but it will suffice to consider two. At a high level of abstraction are the 
trans-situational principles, relationships, theories, hypotheses, and so on of the field. 
These constitute the general knowledge of the field. They will be true across cases 
and across jurisdictions. They are the sorts of facts that in appropriate cases can 
become legislative facts. At a low level of abstraction are the case-specific facts to 
which the principles of the science are applied and the case-specific conclusions 
which emerge from that application. They are true for the case at bar but not for 
other cases involving other parties and other case facts. They are among the 
adjudicative facts of a case.33 
There is no debate about the scientific facts that occupy the lower level of 
abstraction. They are like any other case-specific, adjudicative facts, and there is no 
reason why the usual rules of procedure, professional responsibility, and due process 
should not determine the circumstances under which they must be made known to 
opposing counsel or to the court and when they may be withheld.34 
If the scientific facts at the higher level of abstraction also are properly thought to 
be adjudicative facts,35 then the above answer is the same for them. For criminal 
prosecutors, this probably means that the weaknesses of the proffered science need to 
be disclosed. If the facts (as to the shakiness of the science) are material to 
identifying the defendant as the perpetrator and they tend to weaken the 
identification and negate guilt, then they are adjudicative facts which tend to 
exculpate and must be disclosed.36  
But the more coherent analysis is that these trans-case facts, if adopted by a court 
as part of a ruling on the admission or exclusion of a specie of evidence and having 
precedential effect, constitute legislative facts. And if they are legislative facts, then 
they are usually treated as the law is treated.37 And if they are treated as law is 
treated, then they probably must be disclosed on the same terms that other adverse 
legal authority must be made known to a court.38 While the duty of disclosure of 
                                                                
32
 For a discussion of the differences between adjudicative and legislative facts and their 
implications, see Advisory Committee’s Comments to FED. R. EVID. 201.  See also John 
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing 
Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986). 
33For a more detailed discussion, see the comments on General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136 (1997), in Saks, supra note 5. 
34This is reflected in ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8 and DR 7-103, which 
prohibit the prosecutor from instituting charges not known to be supported by probable cause, 
and which require the disclosure of evidence to the defense that negates guilt or mitigates the 
offense.  See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
667 (1985). 
35Which seems to be at least the tentative inference to be drawn from the Joiner decision. 
36See supra note 34. 
37Monahan & Walker, supra note 32. 
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adjudicative facts falls most heavily on prosecutors, the duty to disclose adverse 
legal authority falls on both sides of both civil and criminal cases. 
E.  The Obligations of Counsel Representing the Party Against  
Whom the Scientific Evidence Is Offered 
Notwithstanding the duties of disclosure by the proponent of expert evidence, the 
party against whom the expert evidence is to be offered cannot, as a practical matter, 
rely on the proponent’s compliance with those obligations. This is not to impugn the 
honesty of the proponents of scientific evidence; most of them have simply not 
thought about the problem and the obligations that become evident once the problem 
is considered. Consequently, opposing counsel has little choice but to be at least as 
alert and informed about the proffered science as the party proffering it.  
As to the scientific expert witness himself, opposing counsel has no practical 
option other than to assume the worst and prepare for the worst. To assume the worst 
means to assume the expert is an advocate in witness clothing, having inadequate 
understanding of the methods employed and findings reached, and to prepare for 
cross-examination accordingly. With expert witnesses the examination and cross-
examination can be and should be of a high degree of substance, because the 
scientific expert witness’s testimony is supposed to be about scientific substance, not 
credibility or opportunity to observe.  
The ethical questions for the lawyers are also about substance. If there is 
scientific evidence that would help a party’s claim or defense, counsel ought to find 
out about it and offer it. Failure to do so is a failure to provide competent 
representation.39 Does counsel adverse to expert testimony which is offered have an 
ethical duty to challenge the admission of the evidence and (if it is admitted) the 
weight of the evidence? Surely competent representation40 means that the 
weaknesses in evidence offered against one’s client should be brought to light 
(unless there is some tactical reason for letting them go). Those who fail most often 
in this regard appear to be criminal defense lawyers. In a recent extensive review of 
published cases for several years preceding and following Daubert, Risinger found, 
for example, that out of 90 state court opinions in which handwriting identification 
evidence was proffered, there was not a single challenge to the admissibility of the 
forensic handwriting examiners.41  
                                                          
38The Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct require a 
lawyer to disclose legal authority “in the controlling jurisdiction’’ known to be “directly 
adverse” to the position of the client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel.  MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 7-106(B)(1) (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 3.3(a)(3) (1998). Whether legislative facts that are integral to a holding are disclosable in 
the same way that the holding is has not, to my knowledge, been considered yet by any court. 
39MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (1999) (see Comment 5, Thoroughness and 
Preparation, which “includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual . . . elements of the 
problem”). 
40Id. 
41Supra note 4. 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
432 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:421 
III.  THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP OF LAWYERS AND EXPERTS 
What goes on outside the courtroom, before the trial, provides insight into the 
role the law has created for expert witnesses. Most of the contact between experts 
and legal actors goes on outside of the purview of the court, and the great majority of 
cases never reach trial. What goes on in the pre-trial phase is controlled far less by 
rules than the trial is and more by informal practices. The pretrial phase may tell us 
something about the structure of the legal process and may reveal its underlying 
norms in ways that a look at the trial does not. As we shall see, in terms of the 
messages sent to experts about what is expected of them, the black-letter rules of trial 
and the informal processes of pre-trial are at war with each other, sometimes 
trapping expert witnesses in the cross-fire. 
The first thing to notice is that the selection and preparation of experts is by the 
parties. Whereas fact witnesses are limited to those who have observed the events at 
issue in a case, expert witnesses come from a pool that is virtually unlimited. 
Lawyers in civil cases quite properly seek experts whose testimony will be favorable 
to their clients. If they think a preliminary choice unwise, they can dismiss that 
expert and hire a new one or several new ones. On the other hand, shopping for 
experts is given as one of the reasons for judicial counter-measures such as Fed. R. 
Evid. 706.42 In criminal cases, prosecutors are procedurally obligated to make known 
to the defense, upon request, the findings of scientific examinations,43 and are 
constitutionally obligated to inform the defense of all exculpatory evidence.44 The 
disclosure obligations of the defense vary across jurisdictions. Under the Federal 
Rules, they are reciprocal: if the defense makes a disclosure request of the 
Government, the defense obligates itself to share complementary data with the 
Government.45  
In civil cases, or in jurisdictions where criminal defense counsel are more free to 
choose experts and shelter their pre-trial opinions from disclosure, does it create an 
ethical problem if counsel searches for an expert who agrees with the client’s 
position? At one extreme, surely it would be ethically troubling if counsel selected 
experts at random, without regard to what they had to say on the issue at hand. At the 
other extreme, it seems ethically dubious for counsel to search diligently, discarding 
dozens of experts until the rare one is found who happens to agree with the lawyer’s 
theory of the case.  What lines might be drawn between these two extremes? Can 
lines be drawn?  
                                                                
42
“The practice of shopping for experts” is listed as being among “matters of deep 
concern.” Advisory Committee’s Comments to FED. R. EVID. 706. 
43FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D) states:  
Reports of Examinations and Tests. Upon request of a defendant the government shall 
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of 
physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, or copies 
thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the 
existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, 
to the attorney for the government, and which are material to the preparation of the 
defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial. 
44See supra note 34. 
45See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B). 
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Once suitable experts are selected, a competent lawyer will set about to secure 
their loyalty and cooperation. Experts learn much of what they know of the trial and 
(over time) of the law from this teacher with a very particular agenda.46 Lawyers are, 
after all, professional persuaders and negotiators; they do not reserve those skills for 
use in the courtroom. Especially in civil cases, and to a lesser extent in criminal 
cases, lawyers introduce experts to the facts of the case and inform them of what is at 
issue. From this lawyer, in a more or less subtle way, the experts will learn of the 
righteousness of the client on whose side they have been recruited to testify. What 
the expert is or is not comfortable testifying to at trial is determined in advance and, 
if necessary, is “negotiated” between expert and attorney.  
On the one hand, it seems reasonable and perhaps necessary for the attorney to 
determine the extent to which the expert’s knowledge and opinions will support the 
attorney’s theory of the case. It is necessary for the expert to draw the line and not go 
where reasonable inferences from the field’s principles will not allow. If the 
positions presented later are too far out on a limb, is it the fault of the attorney who 
invited the expert to testify, or of the expert? Sometimes the “negotiation” between 
counsel and the expert boils down to what language is to be used to describe the 
expert’s opinion. The attorney is looking for language that will be most helpful to the 
closing argument she wishes to make, while the cooperative, yet by no means 
dishonest, expert is looking for language that will allow him to feel that he did not lie 
or misrepresent his opinion.47 
In a world of powerful subtleties, why even consider money? But the law does. 
The law prohibits the payment of expert witnesses to be contingent upon the 
outcome of the case. Yet in a civil case experts may understand that sometimes, 
unless the outcome is favorable, there may be inadequate money to pay the experts 
(especially if called on behalf of the plaintiff), or that future employment of the 
expert may depend on helping with a successful outcome in the present case. The 
latter is more or less true for all experts who are engaged on an ad hoc basis by all 
sides of all cases. 
What would we think if a law firm that specialized in representing tort plaintiffs 
had at its disposal a firm of varied experts who worked exclusively for tort plaintiffs; 
made their incomes exclusively from the work they did for plaintiff’s lawyers; and 
their salaries, vacation schedules, working conditions, and careers depended on the 
evaluations they received on the work they did for these attorneys? And imagine that 
this firm of varied experts was the exclusive employer of some kinds of experts, so 
that defendants in these tort cases had no experts available to them. Does this 
scenario raise any ethical issues about either the experts or the attorneys using these 
                                                                
46Imagine how different the expert’s education would be if it were provided by a judge or 
a law teacher or a lawyer hired by experts for experts. 
47One example of such language negotiation is provided by the prosecutor and the 
ballistics expert in the case of Sacco and Vanzetti. The firearms expert initially concluded that 
because his tests were not conclusive, they did not confirm that the defendant’s weapon was 
the murder weapon. But the prosecutor negotiated the expert’s testimony into an equivalent 
yet very different-sounding version: that the ballistics findings were not inconsistent with a 
theory that the murder bullets came from the defendant’s gun. The defense was afraid to try to 
dissect this testimony, thinking that to do so unsuccessfully would put the defense in an even 
worse position. L. JOUGHIN & E.M. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1976). 
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experts? With a few small adjustments to the scenario, this fairly well describes our 
system of expert witnesses available in the prosecution of criminal cases.48 
 
IV.  DISCOVERY 
A.  In Civil Cases 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect a dual concern about trials. On the 
one hand, the more each side knows about the evidence the other side is going to 
present, the more a trial will be a contest over the meaning of that evidence and the 
less it will be a “trial by ambush.” On the other hand, the system is adversarial, and 
the parties are encouraged to seek out information and views beneficial to 
themselves, to prepare their cases independently, and not to free ride on the other 
side’s efforts.49 The rules seek to protect both of these interests by making witnesses 
and other evidence subject to disclosure—today even imposing a duty of voluntary 
disclosure—but barring access by each side to the other side’s theories and strategy. 
Thus, the rules of discovery are expansive, generally limited only by whether the 
information sought is “relevant” to the subject matter of the lawsuit and whether the 
information is protected by a privilege. Both sides can make pre-trial inquiries of the 
other side’s witnesses. 
Discovery is, therefore, limited by the attorney work-product doctrine.50 But in 
addition to legitimate work-product protection, lawyers often try to insulate their 
experts and their communications with their experts from discovery, asserting or 
implying that the expert is covered by the doctrine. The work-product doctrine has 
been stated in this language: “In ordering discovery . . . the court shall protect against 
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an 
                                                                
48It might be noted that a few crime laboratories in the United States are deliberately 
organized so that they are not answerable to police or prosecutors, but their funding and 
governance have been arranged so as to keep them more independent. 
49See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee Comments to 1970 
Amendments (“Past judicial restrictions on discovery of an adversary’s expert, particularly as 
to his opinions, reflect the fear that one side will benefit unduly from the other's better 
preparation.  The procedure established in subsection (b)(4)(A) holds the risk to a minimum. 
Discovery is limited to trial witnesses, and may be obtained only at a time when the parties 
know who their expert witnesses will be. A party must as a practical matter prepare his own 
case in advance of that time, for he can hardly hope to build his case out of his opponent's 
experts.”).  See also Scalia, J., dissenting from adoption of amendments to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 1993, 146 F.R.D. 507, 511 (“The proposed new regime does not fit 
comfortably within the American judicial system, which relies on adversarial litigation to 
develop the facts before a neutral decisionmaker.  By placing upon lawyers the obligation to 
disclose information damaging to their clients – on their own initiative, and in a context where 
the lines between what must be disclosed and what need not be disclosed are not clear but 
require the exercise of considerable judgment – the new Rule would place intolerable strain 
upon lawyers’ ethical duty to represent their clients and not to assist the opposing side. 
Requiring a lawyer to make a judgment as to what information is ‘relevant to disputed facts’ 
plainly requires him to use his professional skills in the service of the adversary.”). 
50Reflected in FED. R. CRIM. P.16(a)(2), 16(b)(2) and FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).  See also 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (the seminal case on the work product doctrine). 
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attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.”51 Examples of 
“other representatives” given by the drafters of the rule are private investigators and 
insurance claim agents.52  
There are at least two reasons to think that the phrase “other representative” does 
not include expert witnesses, and therefore what expert witnesses think or write is 
not attorney work product. First of all, the phrase certainly does not include fact 
witnesses. Second, additional civil rules were developed specifically to regulate 
discovery from experts, which implies that experts are not included within the scope 
of “other representatives.” Discovery from experts is divided into two parts. The first 
pertains to expert witnesses and the second to nonwitness experts.  
Concerning testifying expert witnesses, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A) states: “A 
party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions 
may be presented at trial. If a report from the expert is required . . . the deposition 
shall not be conducted until after the report is provided.”53 That seems to leave little 
to secrecy. And the reasoning behind the rule removes all doubt.54 By the lights of 
the black-letter law, expert witnesses expected to testify are witnesses and their 
knowledge, before trial as well as during, is not shielded in the way that the 
knowledge of the advocate is. The knowledge and opinions of consulting, non-
testifying experts, on the other hand, are not subject to disclosure. 
B.  In Criminal Cases 
The rules of criminal procedure reflect still other concerns and a different balance 
to accommodate those concerns. These concerns include protection of a defendant’s 
                                                                
51FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
52See also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 495. 
53This is greater access than provided by the predecessor version of this rule: 
A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person 
whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject 
matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts 
and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds 
for each opinion. Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by other means. 
54Advisory Committee’s Notes to FED. R. CIV. P. 26: 
 
Many . . . cases present intricate and difficult issues as to which expert testimony is 
likely to be determinative.... 
 
[A] prohibition against discovery of information held by expert witnesses produces in 
acute form the very evils that discovery has been created to prevent.... 
 
Effective rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the other 
side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, then the narrowing of issues 
and elimination of surprise which discovery normally produces are frustrated.... 
 
These considerations appear to account for the broadening of discovery against experts 
in the cases cited. . . .  In some instances, the opinions are explicit in relating expanded 
discovery to improved cross-examination and rebuttal at trial.... 
 
These new provisions . . . repudiate the few decisions that have held an expert’s 
information privileged simply because of his [or her] status as an expert....They also 
reject as ill-considered the decisions which have sought to bring expert opinion within 
the work-product doctrine. 
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constitutional right against disclosing anything that might be incriminating, concern 
that criminal defendants who learn the details of the case against them will combat 
that evidence with false testimony55 or threaten witnesses with harm, and awareness 
of the imbalance of knowledge in criminal cases: the prosecution has most of the 
evidence and the rules reflect a wariness of giving too much of it to the defense so as 
to prepare its challenges to that evidence. One solution found in the federal rules is a 
process of defense-controlled, tit-for-tat, reciprocal exchange of information.56 
Whenever the defense seeks discovery of certain prosecution evidence (statements 
by the defendant, tangible evidence, and scientific tests), the prosecution is entitled 
to obtain comparable information from the defense.57 Neither side is permitted to 
make pre-trial inquiries of the witnesses of the other side. 
Thus, the rules of criminal procedure shield more evidence from discovery than 
the civil rules do. And yet, they single out much of the information supplied by 
experts to be made the most accessible.58 
Whether for reasons of overwork or to stymie the defense, government experts 
tend to produce reports that present minimal information about their conclusions and 
the bases for those conclusions. Thus, the law’s goal of forcing the exchange of 
critical information to facilitate trial preparation is frustrated by experts producing 
reports calculated to offer little help to the defense’s trial preparation. In an 
investigation of questionable practices at the FBI Crime Laboratory, the Inspector 
General of the U.S. Department of Justice found that some forensic scientists would 
“spruce up” lab notes (enlarge, embellish and change them) as the case approached 
trial.59 Some of the embellishment was calculated to make the expert’s conclusions 
be more consistent with other evidence in the trial. In addition to frustrating the goals 
of the law, this is poor scientific practice.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
This article has reviewed an array of ethical issues affecting the relationship of 
expert witnesses with lawyers and courts, especially in the criminal justice system. 
Changes in the law governing the admissibility of expert testimony, and growing 
societal concerns about flaws in the criminal trial that permit innocent people to be 
                                                                
55By contrast, our Colonial forebears gave us a system in which all parties were presumed 
to be so incapable of being truthful witnesses that they simply were not permitted to testify. 
See, e.g., Respublica v. Keating, 1 U.S. (Dallas) 110 (1784). More generally, see JOHN H. 
WIGMORE, 2 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 577, 817 (James H. Chadbourne rev. 
1979). 
56At least forty states have statutes governing discovery in criminal cases, and most of 
these are modeled after the federal rule. But a considerable amount of variation exists as to 
whether any particular category of information is something the defendant is entitled to as a 
matter of right, or whether it is controlled by judicial discretion, or whether discovery of the 
information is precluded. 
57See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D), 16(b)(1)(B). 
58Though not as accessible as in civil cases. And yet, though the rules make no provision 
for any pre-trial inquiry of the other side’s experts, other than a written summary, more 
expansive and interactive disclosure sometimes is worked out informally by the parties 
themselves. 
59See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 15.  
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convicted, have inevitably changed the responsibilities of both proponents and 
opponents of expert evidence in criminal trials, so far without much awareness of 
these changes by the lawyers themselves. The familiar tension between the ethical 
obligations of attorneys and their motivation to win their cases faces new strains in 
the arena of expert witnesses.  
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